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THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE:
NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. UNITED STATES &
UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON POST CO.'
On Sunday, June 13, 1971, the New York Times newspaper began
publishing a classified government document which narrated the recent
economic, political and military involvement of the United States in Indo-
china. After the first three daily installments of the "History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy" appeared in the news-
paper, the Executive Branch of the Government, acting through the
Justice Department, sought and obtained a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the further publication of the materials on the ground that
continued publication would endanger the national security.2 Subse-
quently, the Washington Post newspaper began publishing similar ma-
terials and, likewise, was restrained from publication pending judicial
review of the controversy. 3 With unprecedented speed these cases were
brought before the United States Supreme Court. A decision was ren-
dered on June 30, 1971, only fifteen days after the controversy entered
the judicial process.4
1. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
2. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (tem-
porary restraining order granted; preliminary injunction denied on the grounds that the
Government had not met the heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of
prior restraints on expression). The Government appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. This court remanded to the district court to determine whether
specific items filed with the court, or any additional items to be filed by the Government,
posed such grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States as to war-
rant an injuncton against their publication. The temporary restraining order previously
issued was to continue until June 25, 1971 as to the specific items filed with the court; as
to any additional items filed, the temporary restraining order was to remain in effect un-
til disposition by the district court. United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544
(2d Cir. 1971).
3. In its first appearance before district court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell, the Govern-
ment's motion for a temporary restraining order against the Washington Post pending
the hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction was denied. United States v.
Washington Post Co., Criminal No. 1235-71 (D.D.C., June 17, 1971). The Govern-
ment appealed and the district court's denial of the temporary restraining order was
reversed. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971). On
remand, the district court denied the Government's application for a preliminary injunc-
tion and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. United
States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court
agreed to hear an appeal and placed the Post under the same restraints imposed upon
the Times by the Second Circuit. United States v. Washington Post Co., 403 U.S. 943
(1971).
4. 403 U.S. at 713. Writ of certiorari to the Times was granted on June 25, 1971 and
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A per curiam opinion by the Court ordered that the defendant news-
papers be allowed to continue publishing the temporarily suppressed
materials.' The Court held that the government had not met the "heavy
burden" of showing justification for the imposition of prior restraints
on expression.0 In addition, each Justice developed an independent
opinion in order to explicate his affirmance of or dissension with the
per curiam opinion.7  There was little concordance in any one rationale
supporting the compromised generalizations of the per curiam opinion."
Instead, the dicta9 opinions which were intended to supplement and
expand upon the opinion of the Court tended to cloud understanding
of the First Amendment.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of the press.
.. .,,10 This singular phrase, the subject of myriad judicial definitions,
the case set for oral argument on Saturday, June 26, 1971, at 11:00 a.m. 403 U.S. 942
(1971). The restraint imposed upon the Times by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit continued pending argument and decision by the Supreme Court. Id. The Su-
preme Court treated the Government's application for stay as a petition for certiorari in
United States v. Washington Post Co., 403 U.S. 943 (1971). The Government's peti-
tion for certiorari was granted on June 25, 1971 and both cases were consolidated for
purposes of argument. Id.
5. 403 U.S. at 714.
6. Id.
7. Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Stewart, and White concurred with the
per curiam decision; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Harlan dissented
from it.
8. 403 U.S. at 714-63.
9. The members of the Court who concurred in the general resolution of the case la-
belled the instant decision as per curiam. Generally, a per curiam decision is the opin-
ion of the whole Court in situations where the issues are so defined that the opinion is
not supplemented by extended discussion of supporting reasons. BALLrNTINE'S LAW
DICTONARY 932 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 1293 (4th ed. 1951); 20
Am. JuR. 2d Courts § 72 (1965). However, if the decision of the Court in the instant
case is, in fact, a per curiam opinion, the supplementary decisions by each Justice would,
by definition, be dicta. Dicta is distinguished from the holding of the court, and is de-
fined as an expression of opinion which is not necessary to support the decision reached
by the court. 20 Am. Jom. 2d Courts § 74 (1965). However, it should be noted that
(1) the per curiam decision in this case was not reached by the whole court, and (2) the
issues presented were complex.
This definitional discrepancy can be resolved either by conceding that a majority of
the Court may label its generalized conclusion as a per curiam opinion or by redefin-
ing the term per curiam opinion to mean merely a statement of general principles upon
which a majority of the court have agreed.
Nevertheless, the use of the term dicta by this author is limited to facilitating the
distinction between the per curiam opinion and the opinions offered by the individual
Justices. It is not intended to reflect on the respective precedential value of either the
per curiam opinion or the separate opinions.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). The amendment provides in full:
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again defied consistent interpretation in New York Times Co. v. United
States and United States v. Washington Post Co. In these companion
cases, popularly denominated as The Pentagon Papers Case,"1 the ju-
diciary forsook the opportunity to clarify the meaning of this phrase, and
instead asserted a series of broad generalizations which gave merely a
temporizing resolution to the particular issues presented. Nevertheless,
the significance of these cases demands attention. They apparently
represent the first instance where the Executive Branch of the United
States Government has, without legislative authorization, petitioned the
Judiciary for assistance in preventing the publication of material by the
press.
12
In its argument before the Court, the Executive contended that not-
withstanding the First Amendment
[t]he authority of the Executive Department to protect the nation against
publication of information whose disclosure would endanger the na-
tional security stems from two interrelated sources: the constitutional
power of the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his au-
thority as Commander-in-Chief.' 3
By petitioning the Judiciary to suppress the allegedly harmful informa-
tion, the Executive sought to expand the scope of its authority. Re-
gardless of the classified nature of the materials, or the possible avail-
ability of other sanctions which would likewise hinder their publication,
the Executive asserted that an injunction should be issued by the Court
whenever the Executive could substantiate its claim that the publication
would cause grave and irreparable danger to the national security.14
These contentions were viewed adversely by a majority of the Court
in the per curiam opinion. The government had not urged the punish-
ment of the two newspapers for the violation of any criminal statute,
but instead had sought an injunction to restrain the further publica-
tion of certain materials regardless of whether subsequent criminal sanc-
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
11. See NEw YORK TImms, THE PENTAGON PAPERS (Quadrangle ed. 1971); Victory
For the Press, Newsweek, July 12, 1971, at 16.
12. Judge J. Skelly Wright of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ob-
served:
This is a sad day for America. Today, for the first time in the two hundred
years of our history, the executive department has succeeded in stopping the presses.
It has enlisted the judiciary in the suppression of our most precious freedom.
United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1325 (1971) (dissenting).
13. 403 U.S. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 732 (White, J., concurring).
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tions could be imposed. The Executive Branch attempted to restrain
or suppress from future publication particular materials which it claimed
would adversely affect the national security. This claim was based
both upon the contents of past publications and upon knowledge of the
contents of the materials believed to be in the possession of the Times
and the Post. Therefore, the primary consideration for the Court was
the First Amendment guarantee against the imposition of prior restraints
on expression.' 5
The per curiam opinion in New York Times held that "[a]ny system
of prior restraints of expression . . . [bears] a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity."' 6  The Court concluded that the
government had not overcome the presumption because it had not met
the "heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a
restraint."' 7  Accordingly, the question for future litigation, since the
Court has recognized that prior restraints are not unconstitutional "un-
der all circumstances,""' is what burden must the government meet to
overcome the presumptive unconstitutionality of prior restraints.
It should be noted that the Court has frequently been asked to de-
cide whether a system of prior restraints in the context of cases con-
cerning the publication of allegedly obscene materials is violative of
the First Amendment. 9 Yet to apply the intricate and specific rules de-
veloped for that area to the regulation of political expression would be
misleading. Such an application could quite possibly lead to an er-
roneous prediction of the present Court's reaction to an attempted Legis-
lative or Executive imposition of a system of prior restraints regulating
15. Id. at 714. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-15 (1931).
16. 403 U.S. at 714, quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
In Bantam, it was held that a procedure whereby a state commission was to notify dis-
tributors of certain publications that the Commission deemed the publication to be
obscene and thus subject to police action was an informal system of censorship vio-
lative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
17. 403 U.S. at 714, quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419 (1971). In Keefe, a state court granted injunctive relief to a real estate broker
against the distribution of material which allegedly violated his right to privacy. The
Court reversed, holding that the individual had not justified imposition of such a prior
restraint on expression.
18. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (municipal code
which required prior submission of all motion pictures and prohibited their exhibition
unless they met the requisite standard held not unconstitutionally void on its face).
19. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (absence of adequate
safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expression render state requirement
of prior submission of motion pictures to a board of censors unconstitutional); Kings-
ley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (state, pursuant to a criminal statute,
can obtain injunctive relief against publication of obscene materials without violating
freedom of speech or press).
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materials allegedly at odds with national security.20 Nevertheless, the
obscenity case decisions do illustrate that a majority of the Court has oc-
casionally found prior restraint of expression to be compatible with the
dictates of the First Amendment. 1
When confronted with a situation in which the First Amendment
guarantees are pitted against a system of prior restraints, the Court not
infrequently looks to Near v. Minnesota2 2 as the guiding precedent. In
Near, a state legislature had established a procedure whereby publica-
tion of materials of a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" nature
could be declared a nuisance and be perpetually enjoined from further
publication. A complaint was filed against a newspaper publisher who,
after denying that the materials published were of a "malicious, scan-
dalous and defamatory" nature, asserted his constitutional guarantee of
"freedom of the press."23 The question whether Minnesota's legislative
pronouncement was consonant with First Amendment guarantees was
presented to the United States Supreme Court after the defendant had
been perpetually enjoined from further publication.24 The Court con-
cluded the Minnesota procedure was constitutionally defective since
it established an invalid system of prior restraints.2" After asserting
that the primary purpose of the First Amendment in the area of freedom
of expression was to prevent previous restraint on such expression, the
Court set forth an often noted exposition on the broad perimeters of
that guarantee:
The objection has also been made that the principle as to immunity
from previous restraint is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is
deemed to be prohibited. That is undoubtedly true; the protection
even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limi-
tation has been recognized only in exceptional cases: "When a na-
tion is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such
a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long
as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52. No
one would question but that a government might prevent actual ob-
struction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar grounds,
20. 403 U.S. at 726.
21. See, e.g., Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
22. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
23. Id. at 703.
24. Id. at 705.
25. Id. at 723.
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the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
publications. The security of the community life may be protected
against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of
orderly government.
26
Schenck v. United States27 was offered by the Court in Near as an
example of an exception to absolute constitutional prohibition of prior
restraints. Initially, Schenck would appear the most relevant of past
cases to the instant case since the interest sought to be protected was also
national security. However, the authoritativeness of Schenck in situa-
tions involving the constitutionality of prior restraints is dubious. The
Schenck Court was called upon to decide the validity of a conviction un-
der the Espionage Act of 191728 which prohibited the distribution of
documents deemed to be "calculated to cause . . . insubordination and
obstruction" of recruitment and enlistment into the armed forces.2 9 This
statute did not purport to authorize a censorial system of prior restraints
on expression thought threatening to the national interest, but rather
provided criminal sanctions for individuals who distributed certain ma-
terials which were later held to be subversive. 30 Justice Holmes, writ-
ing the opinion for the Court in Schenck, concluded:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
31
The resonance of the language cannot be denied. It is doubtful,
however, that Justice Holmes was urging that Congress, or the Execu-
tive for that matter, had the right to prevent the happening of such sub-
stantive evils by instituting a system of prior restraints on expression.
He was merely suggesting that an individual whose expression created
a "clear and present danger" of bringing about substantive evil could
be "punished" by Congress.
A concern for the "primary requirements of decency '32 as well as
the "security of the community" 3 are the only interests which the Court
26. Id. at 715-16 (footnote omitted).
27. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
28. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 218-19.
29. 249 U.S. at 49.
30. Id. at 51-52.
31. Id. at 52.
32. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
33. 283 U.S. at 716. Compare Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne,
393 U.S. 175 (1968) (ex parte restraining order against public rally where militant
racist speeches had been given held invalid because the First Amendment required a
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has, to any significant degree, felt compelling enough to outweigh the
First Amendment prohibition against prior restraint of expression. And
only infrequently have such interests resulted in the abrogation of the
First Amendment exaction.3 4  Consequently, the only valid indication
of the Supreme Court's reaction to an attempt to establish a system of
prior restraints where the interest involved was an imperiled national
security must be drawn from the Pentagon Papers case itself.8 Al-
though the per curiam opinion in the case reflects compromise, the dicta
opinions allow significant insight into the attitudes of the individual Jus-
tices toward prior restraint on publication when a national security
interest is involved.
The Justices who concurred in the Court's opinion did so either by
proclaiming that the First Amendment made no provision for govern-
mental restraint on the press or by applying individualized and opaque
concepts of separation of powers which in general rejected the means
with which the Executive sought to effect its self-proposed preroga-
tive.36  Those Justices37 who relied upon an absolute First Amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of the press were necessarily denying the
ability of the Executive to constrain freedom of expression by any
means. However, by merely denying the means-judicial injunctive
relief-chosen by the Executive to effectuate its purpose, the other
Justices38 impliedly recognized a larger scope of Executive authority.89
showing that it was impossible to serve or notify the opposing party), with Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (state law forbidding derisive or offensive
language in a public place held not violative of the First Amendment).
34. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (conviction under a crimi-
nal statute which prohibited denigrating racial utterances held not violative of the First
Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
35. 403 U.S. at 724-27 (Justice Brennan concurring).
36. See text accompanying notes 99-113 infra.
37. Justice Black and Justice Douglas.
38. Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan. Justice White and Justice Stewart might
also be considered within this group because they analytically deferred from con-
straining Executive power solely by the application of the First Amendment. How-
ever, since the guarantees of the First Amendment were a consideration in Justices
White and Stewart's ultimate determination of the appropriateness of the Executive
action, their opinions should theoretically be distinguished from this group.
39. Whether the Executive could attain the desired result through other means is a
question left unanswered by these Justices. Here, these Justices withheld judicial aid
(i.e., granting the requested relief) not because the Executive was constrained by the
First Amendment, but rather because the Judiciary was somehow constrained by the dic-
tates of that amendment. See text accompanying notes 94-97 infra. For example, Jus-
tice Brennan concluded:
In no event may mere conclusions be sufficient: for if the Executive Branch
seeks judicial aid in preventing publication, it must inevitably submit the basis
upon which that aid is sought to scrutiny by the judiciary. And therefore, every
NOTES
Finally, the dissenting Justices, 40 in showing a special regard for Execu-
tive power, placed no definitive limitation upon the Executive as the
Commander-in-Chief and "sole organ" of the nation in the area of for-
eign affairs.4'
The Court's staunch First Amendment absolutist, Justice Black, was
joined in his concurring opinion by Justice Douglas. Justice Black
answered those who advanced the national security interest as justifica-
tion for even a temporary shunting of the First Amendment requisites
by stating:
[E]very moment's continuance of the injunctions against these news-
papers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation
of the First Amendment.42
This idea is one often expressed by Justice Black in dissenting opinions
whenever a limitation is sought to be placed -upon the First Amend-
ment.43 According to Justice Black, the Government could never pre-
sent a showing sufficient to overcome the strictures of the First Amend-
ment.
I believe the Federal Government is without any power whatever
under the Constitution to put any type of burden on speech and ex-
pression of ideas of any kind. .... 44
This absolutist position would not even allow a court to maintain the
status quo in order to ensure proper judicial review.45
restraint issued in this case, whatever its form, has violated the First Amendment.
403 U.S. at 727 (emphasis added).
Clearly, such an analysis does not purport to limit the scope of Executive power, but
rather, prescribes the requisites for judicial participation.
Whether the Executive could utilize other means (e.g., physically seizing the al-
legedly purloined materials or confiscating the newspapers containing selected por-
tions of those materials) to suppress publication of these materials and whether such
means are within the purview of Executive power are questions which remain unan-
swered by the rationale offered by these Justices.
40. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Harlan.
41. See text accompanying notes 67-81, 123-34 infra.
42. 403 U.S. at 715.
43. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 259 (dissenting opinion of Justice
Black) (majority upheld a conviction under the membership clause of the Smith Act
where the lower court found that the petitioner knew the purposes of the organization
which advocated the overthrow of the government and was an active member of such
an organization); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952) (Black, J., dis-
senting). See also McBride, Mr. Justice Black and His Qualified Absolutes, 2 Loy.
U. L. A. L. REv. 37 (1969).
44. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (ma-
jority affirmed a conviction based on a federal statute prohibiting the use of the mails
for the transmission of obscene materials.
45. 403 U.S. at 715.
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Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, concurred. He reiterated
the absolutist formula for First Amendment interpretation. Justice
Douglas concluded that the Executive has no inherent power to obtain
injunctive relief to restrain publications deemed harmful to national
security;46 that, in any event, no statute proscribes publication of the
suspect material; 47 and that because Congress has not declared the
existence of any war, the war power may not be employed to justify a
prior restraint.48 He acknowledged that the "disclosures may have a
serious impact" but found "no basis for sanctioning a previous restraint
on the press." 49 This view is consistent with the position Justice Doug-
las recently expressed in Brandenburg v. Ohio:50
The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what
may be made impermissible and subject to regulation, is the line be-
tween ideas and overt acts. 51
Thus, Justice Douglas' opinion in New York Times clearly manifests his
desire to extend absolute First Amendment protection to any expression
which does not constitute an "overt act" and to make the protection
operable against all Branches of the Government.
Justice Brennan, who also concurred, conceded that it is possible to
abrogate the dictates of the First Amendment in order to protect the
national security. However, the Justice's belief that the Government
must meet a heavy burden of proof to justify this is evidenced by the
example he gave of a justifying national security interest:
Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must in-
evitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event
kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can sup-
port even the issuance of an interim restraining order.52
In Justice Brennan's view, a necessary imperative of such an obviation
of the First Amendment is the need for a prompt judicial determination
of whether the matters sought to be suppressed would bring about sub.
stantial detriment to the national security.53 He did not deem the pres-
ent circumstances sufficient to permit prior restraint because "[u]nless
46. id. at 723, citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
47. Id. at 720-22.
48. Id. at 722, citing U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. Justice Douglas expressly reserved
judgment on what effect the war power of Congress might have in this area. Id.
49. Id. at 722-23 (footnote omitted).
50. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
51. Id. at 456 (concurring opinion).
52. 403 U.S. at 726-27.
53. Id.
[Vol. 5
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and -until the Government has clearly made out its case, the First
Amendment commands that no injunction may issue."'54
The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, which was joined in by Jus-
tice White, asserted that although under some circumstances prior re-
straints were permissible, in the present case the Government had not
met the heavy burden of justification. 55 Justice Stewart noted that the
Executive was endowed with tremendous power in the area of national
defense and international relations, 56 and that with this power goes the
responsibility for its use.57  Having raised the concept of separation of
powers, Justice Stewart felt content to ignore its implications and con-
cluded that regardless of the Executive's power it could not be exer-
cised unless "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation
or its people" were shown.
58
In concurring, Justice White, with whom Justice Stewart joined, ech-
oed the sentiments of Justice Stewart. After expressing his hope that
a "responsible press" would not publish materials which imperil na-
tional security,59 Justice White observed that Congress had addressed
the problem of potential threats to national security only through the
deterrence of criminal sanctions, and not through any injunctive rem-
edy. 60 He did not foreclose to the Government the possibility of pro-
54. Id. at 727. Cf., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
opinion of the Court).
55. Justice Stewart stated:
We are asked, instead, to perform a function that the Constitution gave to the
Executive, not the Judiciary. We are asked, quite simply, to prevent the publica-
tion by two newspapers of material that the Executive Branch insists should not, in
the national interest, be published. I am convinced that the Executive is correct
with respect to some of the documents involved. But I cannot say that disclosure
of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to
our Nation or its people. That being so, there can under the First Amendment be
but one judicial resolution of the issues before us. 403 U.S. at 730.
Similarly, Justice White stated:
I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment permit an in-
junction against publishing information about government plans or aspirations.
Nor, after examining the material the Government characterizes as the most sensi-
tive and destructive, can I deny that revelation of these documents will do substan-
tial damage to public interests. Indeed, I am confident that their disclosure will
have that result. But I nevertheless agree that the United States has not satisfied
the very heavy burden that it must meet to warrant an injunction against publica-
tion in these cases, at least in the absence of express and appropriately limited con-
gressional authorization for prior restraints in circumstances such as these. Id. at
731 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 727.
57. Id. at 728-29.
58. id. at 730.
59. Id. at 733.
60. Id. at 740.
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ceeding under criminal statutes when the difficult task of justifying a
prior restraint meets with failure. 61
Justice Marshall concurred; he framed the ultimate issue as "whether
this Court or the Congress has the power to make law. '0 2  Again,
the broad powers of the Executive were acknowledged, but Justice Mar-
shall, adopting a separation of powers argument, refused to grant a pre-
liminary injunction."3 The Justice pointed out the continuing refusal
of Congress to "enact legislation that would have made the conduct
engaged in . . . unlawful and given the President the power that he
seeks.""4  Justice Marshall noted that a court of equity could not en-
join the commission of a crime, 5 and that it would be inconsistent
with the separation of powers doctrine for the Court to exercise its con-
tempt power to bar an act which Congress has expressly declined to
proscribe.
66
In dissenting, Chief Justice Burger declined to consider the merits
of the case.67  Although he emphatically rejected any concept of First
Amendment absolutism, 8 the major portion of his opinion was dedi-
cated to castigating the Times for its defensive assertion that the First
Amendment guaranteed the "public's right to know" the information
in the newspaper's possession and, therefore, the government could not
prevent their publication. 9 Justice Burger, noting that the Times had
concealed the contents of classified papers from the public for a period
of three to four months while editing them for publication, implied
that there was justification for the imposition of a prior restraint under
the circumstances. 70  The Chief Justice asserted that the present con-
61. Id. at 733-34.
62. Id. at 741.
63. Id. at 741-42.
64. Id. at 746.
65. Id. at 744.
66. Id. at 742.
67. Id. at 752.
68. Id. at 748-49.
69. Id. at 749-50. Chief Justice Burger stated:
The newspapers make a derivative claim under the First Amendment; they denomi-
nate this right as the public right-to-know; by implication, the Times asserts a sole
trusteeship of that right by virtue of its journalistic "scoop." The right is asserted
as an absolute. Of course, the First Amendment itself is not an absolute ...
Id. at 749.
Although the Chief Justice did not expressly consider whether such a right exists, by
implication he believes it is neither absolute nor part of the First Amendment. See
generally Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know: A National
Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L. Rnv. 630 (1968).
70. No doubt this [delay in publication] was for a good reason; the analysis of
7,000 pages of complex material drawn from a vastly greater volume of material
would inevitably take time and the writing of good news stories takes time. But
[Vol. 5
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troversy could have been easily avoided by the newspapers had they
notified the Government while the materials were being prepared for
publication so that an adequate resolution could have been reached
through private negotiations. 71  In addition, the Chief Justice voiced
his discontent with the unseemly haste with which the litigation was
conducted and with the inadequate record.72
Joined in his dissent by both the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun,
Justice Harlan condemned the "feverish" speed with which the Court
decided the case and stressed a list of important questions of fact, law,
and judgment which had received insufficient consideration due to the
time pressures involved .7  He also advanced a separation of powers
argument which would limit judicial review of the Executive power to
enjoin publication to a determination that the disputed matter is "within
the proper compass of the President's foreign relations power. '7 4  A
wider based review, he felt, would be invalid since political questions
are outside the ambit of the Judicial power. 75 As a safeguard to First
Amendment values, the Justice would require that material, the disclo-
sure of which it is claimed will irreparably impair the national security,
be designated as harmful only in response to an actual personal exami-
nation by the head of the Executive Department involved.76  Justice
Harlan (and also Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun) would
have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit77 and vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit,78 remanding both cases for further proceed-
ings in their respective district courts.
Finally, Justice Blackmun dissented on largely identical grounds to
those set forth by the Chief Justice in his opinion. Lamenting the haste
with which the cases had been adjudicated, Justice Blackmun sought
their remand for proper deliberation:
It may well be that if these cases were allowed to develop as they
why should the United States Government, from whom this information was illeg-
ally acquired by someone, along with all the counsel, trial judges, and appellate
judges be placed under needless pressure? After these months of deferral, the al-
leged right-to-know has somehow and suddenly become a right that must be vindi-
cated instanter. 403 U.S. at 750.
71. 403 U.S. at 750-51.
72. Id. at 749, 751.
73. Id. at 753-55.
74. Id. at 757.
75. Id. at 757-58.
76. Id. at 757.
77. Id. at 758. See note 2 supra.
78. 403 U.S. at 758. See note 3 supra.
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should be developed, and to be tried as lawyers should try them and as
courts should hear them, free of pressure and panic and sensationalism,
other light would be shed on the situation and contrary considerations,
for me, might prevail.
7 9
Thus, maintenance of the status quo in order to ensure proper judicial
review would not, in Justice Blackmun's view, be abhorrent to the val-
ues of the First Amendment. He considered the dilemma as one re-
quiring the balancing of "the broad right of the press to print" against
"the very narrow right of the Government to prevent."80  Nevertheless,
he concluded that the Government's narrow right had been jeopardized
and he decried the actions of the papers and importuned the press to be
more responsible in the future.81
Although the rhetoric of the separate opinions tended to be flawed
due to time pressures upon the Justices, there can be gleaned from these
opinions some inkling of how the determinative question of the purview
of Executive power will be resolved. Perhaps the identical issue will
confront the Court when there is ample time for deliberated and de-
tailed opinions. Then, as Justice Blackmun stated, "other light would
be shed on the situation and contrary considerations . . . might pre-
vail.")
8 2
In his concurring opinion, Justice Black applied the freedom of press
guarantee of the First Amendment to absolutely deny the Executive
the power to restrain expression. 83 The First Amendment, however,
provides only that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of the press."" There is no mention of any restriction upon the
Executive Branch of Government. By using an absolutist approach,
Justice Black thus ignored the principle that the Courts are obliged "to
enforce the First Amendment to the full extent of its express and
unequivocal terms .... 85 Instead, in order to circumscribe Execu-
tive authority, Justice Black transcended the literality of that phrase
with an interpretation of the amendment not confined by its "express
and unequivocal terms" and unsupported by authority.88 In so doing, he
79. 403 U.S. at 762.
80. Id. at 761.
81. Id. at 762-63.
82. Id. at 762.
83. 403 U.S. at 717.
84. See note 10 supra.
85. In Re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (majority
held that a denial of petitioner's application for admission to the Illinois Bar on the
ground that he refused to answer any questions pertaining to his membership in the
Communist Party did not violate his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
86. 403 U.S. at 716. While Justice Black devoted the majority of his opinion to a
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placed reliance upon the language of one of the Constitution's original
framers, James Madison, for explanation and corroboration:
Madison proposed what later became the First Amendment in three
parts, two of which are set out below, and one of which proclaimed:
"The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak,
to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press,
as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable." The amend-
ments were offered to curtail and restrict the general powers granted
to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches two years before
in the original Constitution. The Bill of Rights changed the original
Constitution into a new charter under which no branch of government
could abridge the people's freedoms of press, speech, religion, and as-
sembly.8
7
Justice Black read the First Amendment as proposed, however, with-
out considering the language which was actually ratified. 88 Notwith-
standing the salubriousness of his proposition, the Justice neglected to
examined the determinative question of why the language of the First
Amendment was altered to affect only Congress. Such an examination
would seem imperative to substantiate the validity of his thesis. The
language of many of the remaining nine original amendments evidences
the ability of the Framers to formulate directives intended to restrict
the powers of all Branches of the Government. 9 In the instance of the
First Amendment, however, they specifically declined to do so.
A possible explanation for this distinction emanates from the supposi-
tion that Executive authority, as defined by the original Constitution,
posed a less imminent threat to the domestic freedoms of the people than
did Legislative power.9 0 Perhaps it was the ability of Congress to make
nebulous construction of the First Amendment which expressly limited Executive power,
he equivocated from that analysis in his conclusion. Apparently denying the efficacy of
his own argument, Justice Black concluded with a vague notion of separation of powers
which compelled the Judiciary to reject the Executive's contentions:
Instead [the Executive] makes the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention
that the courts should take it upon themselves to "make" a law abridging freedom
of the press in the name of equity, presidential power and national security, even
when the representatives of the people in Congress have adhered to the command
of the First Amendment and refused to make such a law. 403 U.S. at 718.
87. Id. at 716 (emphasis added by Justice Black) (footnote omitted).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. II: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed."
Certainly, the language of this amendment effectively constrains the powers of all the
Branches of Government. It is not expressly limited to prohibit "Congress" from "mak-
ing a law" which could restrict the people's right to "keep and bear Arms."
90. Alexander Meiklejohn, in his discussion concerning the views of both Hamilton
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laws having an immediate and sustained effect upon those freedoms, in
contrast to the limited ability of the Executive to affect such freedoms
only in circumstances where the exigencies of its admitted functions de-
manded, which prompted the enactment of the First Amendment. If
Madison's suggestions had been enacted, implicit in the phraseology
would have been a recognition of possible Executive impact upon do-
mestic affairs beyond that countenanced by the Framers. In short, if
the Executive were perceived as possessing the power to affect the free-
doms of speech, religion, and the press co-extensively with Con-
gress, then a basis would exist for possible future expansion of Execu-
tive authority beyond that particularized in the provisions of the origi-
nal Constitution. The Framers, in formulating the text of the Consti-
tution, were certainly cognizant of the need to "admit" power by im-
plication from those particularized powers.91 To be consistent with
their intention of specifically enumerating and thereby guaranteeing cer-
tain specified rights to the people, however, the Framers formulated
and enacted amendments which would be antithetical to any interpre-
tation implying more expansive power to the specific Branches of the
Government.9" Even Madison requested that only those rights "ex-
and Madison as they related to the necessity of establishing a Bill of Rights primarily to
constrain Legislative power, quoted Hamilton:
"[1]t is against the enterprising ambition of this department [the legislature] that
the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions." A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 103 (1st ed. 1960).
A similar belief was expressed by James Madison in 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 (1834)
[1789-1791]:
In our Government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard against the abuse in the
executive department than any other; because it is not the stronger branch of the
system, but the weaker....
Certainly, if the general intent underlying the Bill of Rights was to limit the omnipo-
tent reach of the Legislative Branch, then a provision which was specifically directed to-
ward that end must be narrowly interpreted.
However, the Executive Branch can no longer be considered less of a threat to the do-
mestic freedoms of the people than 'the Legislative. 403 U.S. at 727-28 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22
(1936). Accordingly, it is not suggested that the Court should guarantee the First
Amendment rights only against encroachment by Legislative power. However, the legal
system demands an adequate explanation when documents containing the underlying
principles of that system are given an expedient but non-literal interpretation.
91. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 789 (1834) [1789-17911; G. BANCKROFr, HISTORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATEs 217-18 (1884); S.J. KONEFSKY, JOHN MAR-
SHALL AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON 66-71 (1964); A. HAMILTON, Opinion on the Con.
stitutionality of the Bank of the United States in FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING
337-38 (A. Mason ed. 1965).
92. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, in FREE
GovENMENT INr NHE MAKING 320 (A. Mason ed. 1965); see generally 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 440-68 (1834) [1789-17911.
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pressly stipulated" should be guaranteed. 93
Nevertheless, all of the Justices who concurred in the majority result,
except Justice Marshall, 94 referred specifically, but without acceptable
explanation, to the application of the First Amendment as a limitation
upon Executive power. The nature and degree of their dependence
upon the principles of the First Amendment as a determinative factor
in the resolution of the present controversy varied greatly. At one ex-
treme was Justice Black and Justice Douglas who concurred in con-
struing the First Amendment as an absolute obstruction to Executive
power in this area. 95 Exemplifying the moderate position was Justice
Stewart who, while recognizing the necessity of governmental secrecy,96
denied judicial participation in the present situation to maintain such
secrecy, ostensibly on the basis that the First Amendment directs judi-
cial abstention unless "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage" to
the national security interest would result from disclosure.97  Signifi-
cantly, no Justice produced authority to substantiate the interpretation
of First Amendment language as a constraint upon Executive or Judicial
power.
The First Amendment, which expressly purports only to direct Con-
gress in its capacity as a legislative entity, has now been clearly given
an interpretation which limits the powers of both the Executive and Ju-
dicial Branches. 98 The formulation and application of this unpreviewed
93. If they [Bill of Rights] are incorporated into the constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of
those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of
power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every en-
croachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declara-
tion of rights. Id. at 457 (emphasis added).
94. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and White.
95. 403 U.S. at 720.
96. Id. at 728.
97. Id. at 730.
98. This is not the first time the Supreme Court has, without explanation, applied the
First Amendment prohibition to the Judiciary. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941). In Bridges, the trial judge had convicted the petitioners of criminal contempt
for publishing their opinions concerning judicial proceedings. The contempt citation
and the subsequent conviction were not authorized by California statute, but rather,
were based on the court's self-possessed power to insure against interference or obstruc-
tion of a defendant's right to a "fair trial." Id. at 259. Justice Black, speaking for the
Court, stated that the primary issue in the Bridges case "relate[s] to the scope of our
national constitutional policy safeguarding free speech and a free press." Id. at 258.
Justice Black asserted that the appropriate scope of review should not be limited to an
examination of the power of a state judge,
[bjut in deciding whether or not the sweeping constitutional mandate against any
law "abridging the freedom of speech or of the press" forbids it, we are necessarily
measuring a power of all American courts, both state and federal, including this one.
Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
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analysis implies the nonexistence of an efficacious alternative rationale,
founded upon recognized precedent, which could restrict Executive
power. Yet those Justices who relied upon such an ambitious con-
struction of the First Amendment in order to restrain Executive power
or compel Judicial abstention, obviously concluded that such an
alternative was ineffable.
Justice Marshall declined to resolve the present controversy on the
basis of the First Amendment. He concluded that the action of the
Executive was precluded by the constitutional principle of separation
of powers among the three Branches of Government."9 Although Jus-
tice Marshall asserted that the ultimate question was "whether this Court
or the Congress has the power to make law,"10 the residuum of his
opinion shows that he presented the issue too narrowly. His determina-
tion was not based upon an examination of Judicial power in the ab-
stract, but was primarily concerned with whether the Judiciary could
sanction and effectuate the Executive's purpose, and at the same time
maintain the required balance between Executive and Legislative power.
In order to secure judicial approbation, the Executive has the burden of
showing the desired end to be within the perimeters of its authority.
Hence, any question of Judicial power is necessarily resolved by a de-
termination of the purview of Executive power.' 01
Without explanation or supportative authority, Justice Black, in reversing the convic-
tion, merely assumed this premise. In short, he expressly applied the First Amendment
to restrict the exercise of Judicial power, without any consideration of the presence of
the term "Congress" in that phrase. The residuum of his opinion was devoted to a rig-
orous application of the "clear and present danger" test in order to determine whether the
Judiciary properly exercised its power. Significantly, the various authorities he relied
on in determining the proper construction of that test, were cases involving a balancing
between the First Amendment rights and Legislative power. Id. at 260-63. In conclud-
ing, Justice Black stated:
For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law "abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press." It must be taken as a command of the
broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society,
will allow. Id. at 263 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Perhaps the significance of the Bridges case is best demonstrated by referring to the
more recent case of Woods v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). In considering the au-
thoritative significance of the Bridges case, the Woods Court declared:
Thus clarifying the exercise of this judicial power in the context of the protections
assured by the First Amendment, the [Bridges] Court held that out-of-court publi-
cations were to be governed by the clear and present danger standard. . . . Id.
at 384 (emphasis added).
To reiterate, this is not to suggest that the First Amendment should not be inter-
preted to constrain all governmental power. The basis of criticism lies, rather, in the
consistent refusal of the Court to explicate and substantiate such a construction.
99. 403 U.S. at 740-41.
100. Id. at 741.
101. In other words, Justice Marshall intended the propriety of Judicial action to be
determined by the resolution of the contest between Executive and Legislative power.
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Although Justice Marshall recognized the broad powers which inure to
the Executive "by virtue of his primary responsibility for the conduct
of our foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief,'10 2 he
denied the supremacy of this power in the present situation, stating:
It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separa-
tion of powers for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent
behavior that Congress has specifically declined to prohibit. There
would be a similar damage to the basic concept of these co-equal
branches of Government if when the Executive Branch has adequate
authority granted by Congress to protect "national security" it can choose
instead to invoke the contempt power of a court to enjoin the threat-
ened conduct. The Constitution provides that Congress shall make
laws, the President execute laws, and courts interpret laws. It did not
provide for government by injunction in which the courts and the
Executive Branch can "make law" without regard to the action of Con-
gress.
10 3
Accordingly, the inference to be drawn from Justice Marshall's opinion
is that if the Judiciary granted the requested relief, it would become the
enforcement medium for an unconstitutional encroachment by the
Executive upon the domain of the Legislative Branch. 04
This approach directly confronted the issue of interpreting the scope of
Executive power. Although Justice Marshall did not expressly rely on
any antecedent formulation of a separation of power theory, his analytical
considerations, and particularly his continued emphasis on Legislative
activity, exhibited a similarity in approach to the concurring opinion
of Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 0 5
In Youngstown, a question of the proper exercise of Executive power
arose when President Truman issued an order directing the Secretary
of Commerce to take possession of and operate many of the Nation's
steel mills. The Executive argued that the action was necessary in or-
der to avoid a "national catastrophe"'0 6 and that authority to act under
102. 403 U.s. at 741.
103. Id. at 742, citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
104. Id. at 745-47.
105. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952). While Justice Marshall's citation of the Youngs-
town decision (403 U.S. at 742) refers to the majority opinion in that case (343 U.S.
at 582), his analysis does not rely on the approach in that opinion, but rather is con-
sistent with the approach adopted by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in
Youngstown.
106. 343 U.S. at 582. The interest advanced by the Executive and rejected by six
Justices in the Youngstown case is comparable to the interest advanced in the instant
case. In Youngstown, the Executive believed that a proposed work stoppage in the Na-
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the circumstances derived from the President's position as the Nation's
Executive and from his power as Commander in Chief.10 7  The lack of
legislative authorization for the Executive action taken in Youngs-
town'0 8 is comparable to the instant case. In Youngstown, however,
while the Executive professed the requisite authority to act from the
aggregate of his constitutional powers, the Executive acted alone by
physically seizing control of the steel mills without petitioning the Judi-
ciary for assistance in effecting its goal.
Justice Jackson presented an empirical analysis of the separate pow-
ers of Government and established a definitive set of criteria with which
to ascertain the existence or non-existence of Executive power in the
Youngstown circumstances. Proceeding from the premise that presi-
dential power fluctuates in relation to its disjunction or conjunction with
the powers of Congress, 09 Justice Jackson presented simplified pattern
situations in which Executive power had been and would likely be
doubted or challenged:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent pow-
ers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. There-
fore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes,
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on inde-
pendent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitu-
tional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclu-
sive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress
from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so
tion's steel mills would immediately harm the national defense. 343 U.S. at 582-83.
In the instant case, the Executive argued that disclosure of certain of the materials al-
legedly in the possession of the two newspapers would jeopardize the foreign relations
of the United States, thereby causing an immediate and irreparable harm to the national
security. 403 U.S. at 732 (White, J., concurring).
107. 343 U.S. at 582. Additionally, Justice Jackson advanced a warning to be con-
sidered whenever Executive power is challenged:
The opinions of judges, no less than executives and publicists, often suffer the in-
firmity of confusing the issue of a power's validity with the cause it is invoked to
promote, of confounding the permanent executive office with its temporary occu-
pant. Id. at 634.
108. Id. at 638.
109. Id. at 635.
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conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is
at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system." 0
Justice Jackson determined that the latter situation was applicable to
the circumstances presented in Youngstown."' By reviewing the fre-
quent legislative expressions concerning seizure of private property, he
established that the requisite "express or implied will" of Congress was
antipathetic to the actions of the Executive."' Justice Jackson con-
cluded that under the circumstances, the President's authority was at
its lowest ebb, and his exercise of Executive power was limited to the
degree of its concordance with prior Congressional expression.
Justice Marshall apparently adopted the criteria propounded by Jus-
tice Jackson. The second of the above quoted practical situations coin-
cides most closely with the general tenor of Justice Marshall's opinion
to the extent that he formulates a proper framework in which to con-
strue Executive power. Whether Justice Marshall intentionally con-
structed his opinion to conform with Justice Jackson's analysis is un-
certain, but the similarities in analysis indicate his reliance on the con-
cept of separation of powers as earlier expressed by Justice Jackson.'"
Justice Marshall emphasized the Legislative action aimed at protecting
the national security from disclosure of harmful information, and more
significantly, he stressed the congressional refusal to delegate the exact
power the Executive sought to exercise here.
Unfortunately, the background of New York Times does not con-
form with any exactness to the factual background of Youngstown.
In particular, Justice Marshall did not establish an "express or implied
110. Id. at 637-38 (footnotes omitted). The first situation presented by Justice Jack-
son, which is not applicable here, occurs when "the President acts pursuant to an ex-
press or implied authorization of Congress." Id. at 635. In such a situation the Presi-
dent's authority is considered at its maximum, "for it includes all thaf he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Id. (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 640.
112. Id. at 643-48.
113. 403 U.S. at 745-46. Additionally, Justice Marshall stated:
And in some situations it may be that under whatever inherent powers the Govern-
ment may have, as well as the implicit authority derived from the President's man-
date to conduct foreign affairs and to act as Commander in Chief there is a basis for
the invocation of the equity jurisdiction of this Court as an aid to prevent the publi-
cation of material damaging to "national security," however that term may be de-
fined.
It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of pow-
ers for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that Congress
has specifically declined to prohibit. There would be a similar damage to the basic
concept of these co-equal branches of Government if when the Executive Branch
has adequate authority granted by Congress to protect "national security" it can
choose instead to invoke the contempt power of a court to enjoin the threatened
conduct. Id. at 742 (emphasis added).
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will" of Congress comparable to that perceived by Justice Jackson in
Youngstown. Prior to that case Congress had acted numerous times in
the area of seizure of private property; moreover, after specifically con-
sidering the subject, Congress declined to grant the exact power the
President attempted to exercise." 4 In the present case, however, while
Congress had enacted restricted legislation which imposed criminal
sanctions for the publication of certain materials,' 15 it had never au-
thorized a system of prior restraints comparable to what the Executive
sought. Justice Marshall relied heavily on the facts that in 1957 Con-
gress had specifically declined to make these types of nonsubversive dis-
closures by publication unlawful," 6 and that in 1917 it had refused to
inhibit such publications by delegation of the exact censorial power
which the Executive attempted to exercise in this case." 17  Justice Mar-
shall ostensibly offered such legislative activity to establish a will of
Congress and thus to delineate the perspective in which to consider the
purview of Executive power. However, neither the congressional fail-
ure to impose criminal sanctions expressly encompassing publications
such as those in the instant case nor Congress' specific refusal to dele-
gate any Executive censorial power with respect to those publications
may have been indicative of the will of Congress. The inaction could
very well have resulted from Congress' cognizance of its own constitu-
tional inability to authorize or delegate this type of power since Con-
gress is expressly prohibited by the First Amendment from imposing
any restraints on freedom of the press. Awareness of this limitation
could forestall any attempt by Congress to delegate power which might
be exercised in derogation of that Amendment. Due to the possible
congressional inability to authorize or delegate such power in the pres-
114. 343 U.S. at 638-39.
115. See Espionage and Censorship Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-99 (1970).
116. 403 U.S. at 747. In 1957 Congress rejected a proposal which suggested that;
Congress enact legislation making it a crime for any person willfully to disclose
without proper authorization, for any purpose whatever, information classified"secret" or "top secret," knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, such in-
formation to have been so classified. Id., quoting REPORT OF COMBUSSION ON
GOVERNMENTAL SEcUmRIT 619-20 (1957).
Congress has made the publication of information relating to certain activities of the
Armed Forces in time of war, "with intent that the same shall be communicated to the
enemy. . .", punishable by death or by imprisonment for any term of years. 18 U.S.C.
§ 794(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
117. 403 U.S. at 746. In 1917 Congress rejected a proposal which provided that:
During any national emergency resulting from a war to which the United States is
a party, or from threat of such a war, the President may, by proclamation, declare
the existence of such emergency and, by proclamation, prohibit the publishing or
communicating of, or the attempting to publish or communicate any information
relating to the national defense which, in his judgment, is of such character that it
is or might be useful to the enemy. Id., quoting 55 CONG. REc. 1763 (1917).
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ent situation, Executive power need not be viewed at its lowest ebb.
Rather, since no recognizable will or constitutional power of Congress
existed to narrow the perspective in which Executive power is to be con-
sidered, a more expansive view of Executive authority is permitted.
Accordingly, within the terms of Justice Jackson's criteria, it would ap-
pear more appropriate to consider the present circumstances as con-
forming with some exactness to the pattern situation where the President
acts without either a Congressional grant or denial of authority." 8
Under this test, Executive power would be dependent upon the
"imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables."" 9 This test
would require a balancing of the equities whenever undefined Executive
power is challenged and would instill reasonable fluidity to any prin-
ciple of separation of powers.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan considered the purview of
Executive power in the abstract and without reference to the Legislative
power. His approach was consistent with the first quoted situation
pattern offered in Youngstown by Justice Jackson. 2 ' Apparently, a
major factor which compelled Justice Harlan to rule against the interests
of the two newspapers was the potential effect the historical revelations
might have on national security.' 2 ' However, the brunt of his criticism
of the Court's majority was directed at their willingness to decide the
case so quickly.' 2 He suggested that the cases be remanded in order
to provide more time for the Government to prepare.123
After criticizing the haste with which New York Times was handled,
Justice Harlan asserted:
It is plain to me that the scope of the judicial function in passing upon
the activities of the Executive Branch of the Government in the field of
foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted. This view is, I think, dic-
tated by the concept of separation of powers upon which our constitu-
tional system rests.'
24
A necessary endowment, the Justice concluded, of the Executive's "con-
stitutional primacy in the field of foreign affairs" is the ability to main-
tain secrets, namely, the authority to suppress materials which would
118. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
119. 343 U.S. at 637. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
121. See 403 U.S. at 754.
122. 403 U.S. at 753: "With all respect, I consider that the Court has been almost
irresponsibly feverish in dealing with these cases."
123. Id. at 758.
124. Id. at 756.
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"'have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce
immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to
other powers.' 125
Justice Harlan foresaw no difficulty with allowing the Judiciary to
provide the means by which the Executive could maintain its secrets as
long as the Judiciary was given the opportunity to review the "initial Ex-
ecutive determination to the point of satisfying itself that the subject
matter of the dispute does lie within the proper compass of the Presi-
dent's foreign relations power."'126  This superficial judicial review
would be required in order to protect the "values of the First Amend-
ment against political pressures. .. . Judicial participation would
be limited, however, to ascertaining whether the contested subject mat-
ter properly fell within the ambit of Executive authority and whether the
determination that the disclosure would be irreparably damaging to
national interest was made at the highest concerned Executive level.' 28
If both determinations were affirmative, the exercise of the power
would be permitted. Under no circumstances did Justice Harlan believe
that it was a proper function for the Court to involve itself with the
merits of the national security question.'
29
No specific authority was provided by Justice Harlan for allowing
limited judicial participation when the Judiciary is requested to act af-
firmatively (i.e., issue an injunction based on its own powers) in con-
junction with the Executive's exercise of power. s0 The Justice merely
stated that the hearings in such a case should be conducted under "ap-
propriate ground rules" and he directed the courts to act with the de-
125. Id. at 756-57, quoting 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 194-95 (J.
Richardson ed. 1896). Richardson quoted from a letter by President Washington
wherein Washington refused to deliver the papers leading up to the negotiation of the
Jay Treaty to the House of Representatives.
126. 403 U.S. at 757.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See 403 at 756-57, citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (gov-
ernment's refusal to disclose matters in a civil discovery proceeding was justified where
the Judge Advocate General claimed disclosure would be detrimental to the national
security); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (delega-
tion of power to the President by Congress to prohibit, by proclamation, the sale of
arms and munitions to belligerent countries was not unconstitutional). Neither Rey-
nolds nor Curtiss-Wright, however, is apposite. In neither case was the Judiciary re-
quested to act (i.e., grant injunctive relief enforceable by its contempt power); rather,
the courts were merely reviewing, after the fact, the constitutionality of Executive and
Legislative action.
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ference owed the conclusions of a "co-equal branch of the Government
operating within the field of its constitutional prerogative." 13 1
In his application of the doctrine of separation of powers, Justice
Harlan warned against Judicial encroachment upon the constitutional
prerogatives of the Executive. Relying upon the same doctrine, Jus-
tice Marshall expressed his concern over permitting the Executive to
trespass upon the constitutionally acquired domain of Congress. It is
likely that reliance upon either of these distinct separation of powers
analyses presented an undesirable alternative to those Justices who con-
sidered the restrictions of the First Amendment determinative of the
question of Executive power.' 32 None of the Justices, however, relied
upon the reasoning set forth by Justice Black in his opinion for the
Court in Youngstown. The analysis in that earlier opinion, an example
of Justice Black's broad brush approach to the question of separation
of powers, could have been used to accommodate the present dispute.
In Youngstown, Justice Black denied the existence of Executive authority
as Commander in Chief other than in the "theater of war"; moreover, he
emphasized the pre-eminence of the Nation's lawmakers over its military
leaders in the area of domestic affairs.1 33 Having considered the ex-
tent of presidential authority derived from the constitutional provision
which vests Executive power,3 Justice Black asserted that the idea
that the President is to be a lawmaker is refuted by the express grant of
that power to the Legislative Branch.3 3  From such a premise, Justice
Black concluded that the President's order and its enforcement was
tantamount to the "making of law," and accordingly, held that the Ex-
ecutive was acting beyond the scope of his authority:
The President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be
executed in a manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a presi-
dential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.
The preamble of the order itself, like that of many statutes, sets out
reasons why the President believes certain policies should be adopted,
proclaims these policies as rules of conduct to be followed, and again,
like a statute, authorizes a government official to promulgate additional
131. 403 U.S. at 758.
132. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
133. 343 U.S. at 587. Justice Douglas concurred in the analysis offered by Jus-
tice Black in Youngstown. Id. at 632. Of course, a determination of whether the
Pentagon Papers were part of the theater of war would be required. A negative an-
swer would be expected.
134. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
135. 343 U.S. at 587-88.
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rules and regulations consistent with the policy proclaimed and needed
to carry that policy into execution.13 6
There was no Executive order per se issued in the Pentagon Papers
case, yet Executive action in petitioning the Judiciary for injunctive relief
to restrain the publication of particular materials would certainly seem
like activity which should be authorized by statute. If Justice Black's
reasoning in Youngstown were applied here, this Executive action
could have been deemed tantamount to the making of law and thus
violative of the separation of powers doctrine.
Although the strength of Justice Black's separation of powers analy-
sis in Youngstown may be subject to question, its use in New York
Times might have avoided additional obfuscation of the meaning of
the First Amendment. But then, as two of the dissenting Justices
pointed out,
[gireat cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law
of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming
interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These
immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes
what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well
settled principles of law will bend. What we have to do in this case is
to find the meaning of some not very difficult words.
18 7
James W. Meisenheimer
136. Id. at 588.
137. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes,
I., dissenting), cited in part at 403 U.S. at 752-53, 759 (Harlan & Blackmun, JJ., dis-
senting).
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